Intuition test: Are you more intuitive or rational?

The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) measures the degree to which people are rational and intuitive (experiential). This rationality and intuition test is based on the theory that there are two ways we process information when solving problems or making decisions.

The first type of thinking is fast and intuitive, called System 1 thinking. The other type is slow, deliberative, analytical, and rational i.e. System 2 thinking. We use both types of thinking depending on the situation but some of us have a greater propensity to be rational while others are more likely to use intuition.

This test makes use of four sub-scales:

  1. Rational Ability: The degree to which being rational is part of your personality.
  2. Rational Engagement: The degree to which you prefer making decisions using rational thinking.
  3. Experiential Ability: Measures to what extent being intuitive is a part of your personality.
  4. Experiential Engagement: The extent to which you use intuition to solve problems.

Taking the test

The test consists of 40 items, each having five choices ranging from Definitely false to Definitely true. Choose the option that most applies to you. Your results will only be displayed to you and won’t be stored in our database.

Intuition test

1. I have a logical mind.
2. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
3. I believe in trusting my hunches.
4. I am not a very analytical thinker.
5. I trust my initial feelings about people.
6. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
7. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
8. I don’t reason well under pressure.
9. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
10. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
11. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
12. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.
13. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
15. I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions.
16. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
17. I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
18. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know.
20. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
21. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
22. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
23. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
24. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
25. I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
26. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
27. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
28. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
29. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
30. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.
32. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
33. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me.
34. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
35. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition.
36. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
37. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
38. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s.
39. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
40. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.

Reference

Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of personality and social psychology76(6), 972.